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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DERRICK N. BRAGG, 




DR. PUSHKALAI PILLAI, Psychiatrist, SCI Greene; ROBERT GILMORE, 
Superintendent, SCI Greene; TRACY SHAWLEY, Grievance Coordinator, SCI Greene; 
KERRI MOORE, Chief Grievance Coordinator, Department of Corrections 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-00581) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan (by consent) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 8, 2020 
 
Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Appellant Derrick Bragg, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 
appeals from an order by the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that 
follow, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the 
relevant facts and procedural history.  Bragg is a Pennsylvania state prisoner who was 
housed at State Correctional Institute Greene (“SCI-Greene”).  In May 2020, Bragg filed 
a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment violations against 
defendants regarding his mental health care, as well as a related retaliation claim.  Braggs 
receives medication to treat schizophrenia.  He alleged that the medication causes him 
anxiety and that defendant Pelai refused to adjust the timing of his medication, impeding 
his ability to participate in daily programs.  Braggs further alleged that defendants 
Gilmore, Shawley, Moore (the “DOC Defendants”) interfered with his mental health 
treatment through their improper handling of grievances he filed against defendant Pelai.  
Braggs seeks damages and injunctive relief.    
DOC defendants and defendant Pelai both filed motions to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  Bragg filed objections in 
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opposition to the motions.  The District Court1 granted defendants’ motions because 
Bragg had not adequately alleged the DOC defendants’ personal responsibility, and had 
failed to state a claim of deliberate indifference to his medical condition, and had not met 
the standard for a valid retaliation claim.  The court declined to provide Bragg an 
opportunity to amend his complaint, concluding that amendment would be futile.  Bragg 
timely filed his notice of appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  See Newark Cab 
Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).  To avoid dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its 
claims are facially plausible.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  We 
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe those facts in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 
2012), and because Bragg is proceeding pro se, we construe his complaint liberally, see 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  We may summarily affirm if 
the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 
247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
 




We agree with the District Court’s assessment that Bragg’s complaint was 
insufficient to state a civil rights action against defendants.  As the District Court 
explained, Bragg has not sufficiently alleged that the DOC defendants were personally 
involved in the decisions concerning the timing of his medical treatment.  See Kaucher v. 
County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him or her of a 
right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.”); Evancho v. Fisher, 
423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (civil rights complaint must allege facts identifying the 
“conduct, time, place, and persons responsible”); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 
1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (plaintiff cannot rely solely on respondeat superior as a theory of 
liability).   
As the District Court also concluded, Bragg’s allegations about inadequate 
medical care do not amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  To succeed on such 
a claim, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that ‘the defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs’ and (2) an objective showing that 
‘those needs were serious.’”  Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 
2017) (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).  Prison officials can “act deliberately 
indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs by ‘intentionally denying or delaying 
access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.’”  Id. (quoting 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)).  However, “mere disagreement as to the 
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proper medical treatment” is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.  
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  When 
medical care is provided, we “presume[s] that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent 
evidence that it violates professional standards of care.”  Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535 (citing 
Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well 
established that as long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will 
not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”)).  Accordingly, we agree with the District 
Court’s determination that a dispute about the timing of Bragg’s medical care was 
insufficient to amount to “deliberate indifference.”  See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346.2 
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.3 
 
2 We also agree with the District Court that Bragg failed to make out allegations based 
on: 1) violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, or 2) retaliation for the filing of a grievance.  Accordingly, the 
District Court did not err in declining to provide an opportunity to amend the complaint. 
3 Appellant’s motion to appoint counsel is denied.  Additionally, Bragg appears to raise 
new issues concerning his conditions of confinement in his motion to appoint counsel.  
Because these issues were not raised in the district court, we will not consider them on 
appeal.  See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule ... 
that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed on below.”).  
